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Spurred at least in part by the revenue crunch precipitated by the 
financial crisis, the United States has taken an aggressive stance 
towards non-reporting of offshore income and attendant offshore tax 
evasion. Our contribution discusses administrative and legal 
mechanisms, especially the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
(FATCA), that the United States has deployed to obtain offshore tax 
information.  As this National Report reveals, while FATCA has been 
widely criticized as unilateral and extraterritorial legislation, it also 
has bolstered the offshore tax compliance efforts of governments 
other than the United States.  For many jurisdictions, FATCA thus 
offers an aspirational new global standard for automatic exchange of 
information – one that would supplement, if not replace, information 
exchange on request. 
I. THE RISE OF FATCA 
Every year, the United States loses at least $100 billion in tax 
revenue as a result of tax evasion that occurs through the use of 
offshore bank accounts.1 Offshore evasion strategies have ranged 
from diversion of earnings from U.S. sources into offshore trusts and 
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1  STAFF OF PERMANENT S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND 
SEC’Y AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., STAFF REP., TAX HAVEN BANKS 
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other entities2 to the conversion of cash holdings by individuals into 
diamonds, which were then smuggled out of the United States 
concealed in a tube of toothpaste before being secreted in Swiss bank 
vaults.3  Historically, these evasion strategies have been effective due 
to other jurisdictions’ strong bank secrecy rules.4  To overcome lack 
of cooperation from other jurisdictions, the United States has 
undertaken a series of aggressive tax enforcement approaches, 
culminating in the adoption of the FATCA in 2010.5    
Background.  Starting in 2001, foreign financial institutions 
(FFIs) could enter into “Qualified Intermediary” (QI) agreements 
with the United States.6  Foreign financial institutions that became 
QIs agreed to determine the identity of their clients, but they did not 
have to report the identities of non-U.S. clients, including 
corporations, to the IRS as long as QIs concluded that the proper 
amount of U.S. tax was withheld on U.S.-source payments to the 
non-U.S. clients.7   
The highly publicized whistleblower case of Bradley Birkenfeld, 
a former UBS banker,8 and the IRS’s related John Doe summonses9 
revealed that UBS encouraged U.S. taxpayers to form foreign shell 
corporations which would then open offshore accounts at UBS.  UBS 
then took the position that no withholding was required with respect 
to the payments to the foreign shells, even though its bankers knew 
 
2 For discussion, see PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, 108TH CONG., TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE 
ENABLERS, THE TOOLS AND SECRECY 1 (2006). 
3 See Mark Hosenball & Evan Thomas, Cracking the Vault, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 
23, 2009, at 32. 
4 See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, Don’t Tread on Me: Has the United States 
Government’s Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for 
Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws?, 30 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1 (2010) (describing Swiss 
bank secrecy rules). 
5 See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 
501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). 
6 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1. 
7 Id. 
8 See Year in Review: The 2009 Person of the Year, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 4, 
2010, at 1-3 (describing Birkenfeld’s actions). 
9 STAFF OF PERMANENT S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND 
SEC’Y AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., STAFF REP., TAX HAVEN BANKS 
AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 3 (2008). 
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that the beneficial owners were U.S. residents.10 Under a deferred 
prosecution agreement with the United States, UBS agreed to pay a 
fine of $780 million, release (through the Swiss government) the 
names of 250 U.S. holders of offshore UBS accounts, and cease its 
illegal banking and brokerage activities in the United States.  Under a 
separate agreement, UBS ultimately agreed to disclose the names of 
4,500 of an estimated 20,000 U.S. holders of offshore accounts at 
UBS.  
There is little reason to think that abuses of the QI regime were 
limited to UBS. The magnitude of offshore evasion became even 
more apparent when, contemporaneously with its actions against 
UBS and other financial institutions, the government announced in 
2009 an offshore voluntary compliance initiative, under which nearly 
15,000 U.S. taxpayers disclosed to the IRS that they held funds in 
previously unreported offshore accounts.11    
FATCA.  In response to the weaknesses of the QI regime, and the 
increased attention on the offshore evasion epidemic following the 
UBS deferred prosecution agreement, Congress enacted FATCA in 
2010.12  Under FATCA, participating FFIs are required to report the 
name, address, and other identifying information for each account 
holder that is a U.S. person, the account number and balance, and any 
gross dividends, interest, and other income paid to the account.   In 
addition, participating FFIs must obtain various documents from any 
account holders that possess indicia of U.S. status, such as a power of 
attorney granted to someone with a U.S. address.   Participating FFIs 
also are required to withhold 30% on certain payments to recalcitrant 
account holders and other financial institutions that do not comply 
with FATCA.    
FATCA’s enforcement mechanism is both potent and innovative.  
FFIs refusing to cooperate with the regime by reporting the required 
information are subject to a 30% withholding tax on certain U.S.-
source payments, including U.S.-source interest and dividends, gross 
proceeds from the sale of assets that generate U.S. dividends and 
 
10 See, e.g., UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 2.  See also id.,  Exhibit 
C, at 4-5. 
11 See Shulman Addresses IRS’s Strategic Priorities for the Future, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, May 19, 2011, at 97-11. 
12 See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 
501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). 
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interest.13  To avoid being subject to this withholding tax, FFIs must 
register with the IRS and commit to report information regarding 
their U.S. account holders and non-U.S. account holders that are 
entities with substantial U.S. owners.14   
Criticism.  Commentators have characterized FATCA as 
“aggressive,”15 “audacious,”16 “egregious,”17 “draconian”18 and 
“devastatingly destructive.”19  The principal criticisms have been that 
FATCA is not only unilateral,20 but also extraterritorial.21  Critics 
contend that FATCA requires financial institutions in jurisdictions 
outside the U.S. to act like “U.S. Treasury watchdogs”22 and that it 
“strong arms every financial institution in the world into doing the 
 
13 See I.R.C. §§ 1471(a), 1473(1). 
14 See I.R.C. § 1471(c). 
15 Scott D. Michel, FATCA: A new era of financial transparency, J. OF ACC., 
Jan. 2013. 
16 Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax 
Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529, 536 (2012). 
17 Don Whiteley, IRS Wants Canada to Nab U.S. Tax Cheats: Why We Should 




19 Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA and US fiscal imperialism threaten to sink 
global economy, THE DAILY CALLER, Mar. 19, 2013, available at 
http://dailycaller.com/2013/03/19/fatca-and-us-fiscal-imperialism-threaten-to-sink-
global-economy/. 
20 See, e.g., EU Parliament FATCA Hearing, May 28, 2013 (statement of 
Marie Rosvall, President of the Fiscal Committee, European Banking Federation) 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRoU-JNFhr0, at 22:44. (“How can 
one country impose its law on other countries without any consultations or 
discussions?”). 
21 Canadian Finance Minister Jim Flahertty described FATCA’s “far-reaching 
extraterritorial implications” that would “turn Canadian banks into extensions of 
the IRS.” Letter from Finance Minister Jim Flaherty to The Washington Post, the 
New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal (Sept. 16, 2011) available at 
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/09/16/read-jim-flahertys-letter-on-
americans-in-canada.  See also Arthur J. Cockfield, The Limits of the International 
Tax Regime as a Commitment Provider, 33 Va. Tax Rev. 59 (2013), at 102-3, (“the 
unilateral nature of FATCA arguably subverts traditional multilateral processes”).  
See also Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 
1373, 1408 (“[FATCA] proposes a turn away from multilateralism”). 
22 Christopher Elias, U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act Threatens 
Investment in the U.S., Thomson Reuters, Jan. 25, 2012. 
 © 2014 Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason 
DRAFT: 8/15/14]   UNITED STATES 5 
job of the IRS.”23  According to representatives of large financial 
institutions and other businesses outside the United States, the 
legislation will result in billions of dollars in implementation costs.24  
In addition, some government officials outside of the United States 
assert that despite the attempt by the United States enter into 
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs), FATCA conflicts with the 
local banking and privacy laws of many other jurisdictions.25  
Further, critics contend that the United States acts like the “loan 
sheriff in town”26 by demanding information from other jurisdictions 
without offering any information in exchange.  In light of this 
criticism and the legal obstacles of local bank secrecy rules, several 
commentators have even predicted that the FATCA regime will not 
survive.27 
III. FROM UNILATERLISM TO MULTILATERALISM 
While complaints about the unilateralism and extraterritoriality of 
FATCA certainly are not without merit, FATCA also has enhanced 
multilateral cooperation in combating tax evasion, and it has spawned 
similar legislation and treaties in other jurisdictions.  This Part 
reviews these developments. 
Model Intergovernmental Agreements.  The largest EU 
countries—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom—as well as the EU’s Commission worked with the United 
States to develop the text of the Model 1 IGA.  Along with the Model 
2 agreement, these IGAs seek to both reduce compliance burdens for 
FFIs and avoid conflicts between FFIs’ obligations under FATCA 
and their client-confidentiality obligations under foreign law.  For 
example, FFIs located in Model 1 partner jurisdictions need not enter 
 
23 Quinlan, supra note 19. 
24 See Kate Burgess, US legislation: Industry concerned at extraterritorial tax 
clampdown plan, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 8, 2012. 
25 Patricia Lee, U.S. extra-territorial approach to regulations could have 
unintended consequences for Asia-Pacific region, Thomson Reuters, Sept. 4, 2012. 
26 Jeff N. Mukadi, FATCA and the Shaping of a New International Tax Order, 
TAX NOTES, June 25, 2012. 
27 See e.g., Peter Spiro, The (Dwindling) Rights and Obligations of Citizenship, 
21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 899 (2013) (“It is not clear that the FATCA regime is 
sustainable”); Frederic Behrens, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why 
FATCA Will Not Stand, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 205. 
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into separate FFI agreements with the United States in order to avoid 
the withholding tax.28  
Importantly, the Model 1 IGA developed with the G5 and the EU 
Commission contemplates reciprocal automatic exchange of 
information from U.S. financial institutions. The United States 
entered into the first Model 1 IGA with the United Kingdom, and 
several more have followed.  The United States is actively engaged in 
talks with 70 jurisdictions regarding FATCA.29   
Son of FATCA.  Perhaps more remarkable has been the adoption 
of FATCA-like legislation or treaties by other jurisdictions.  For 
example, the United Kingdom has drafted “son of FATCA” 
legislation aimed at securing information from its crown 
dependencies and overseas territories.30  In addition to this 
legislation, the United Kingdom has entered into information-sharing 
agreements with its crown dependencies modeled on the U.S.-U.K. 
bilateral IGA.31  Notably, in order to minimize additional compliance 
burdens for financial institutions, the United Kingdom has 
incorporated nearly identical reporting requirements as those required 
under the U.S. model IGAs, even going so far as to denominate 
threshold account values in U.S. dollars and incorporating by 
reference U.S. Treasury regulations.32  An important difference is that 
 
28 Other benefits of the Model I IGA for FFIs include reduced due diligence 
requirements and exemptions from FATCA reporting requirements for more kinds 
of institutions and products. 
29 Robert Stack, Myth vs. FATCA: The Truth About Treasury’s Effort to 
Combat Offshore Evasion (Sept. 20, 2013) available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Myth-vs-FATCA.aspx .   Under the 
Model 2 IGA, the FATCA partner country will authorize its FFIs to report 
FATCA-required information directly to the IRS.  The U.S. has entered into Model 
2 IGAs with Bermuda, Japan, and Switzerland.   
30 John McCann & Angela Nightingale, Tax Information Sharing, The Rise of 
‘FATCA-esque” Agreements.  Aima, p. 2,  October 24, 2013 available at 
www.aima.org/en/education/aimajournal/q12013/tax-information-sharing.cfm 
31 Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey.  See, e.g., Statement of Guernsey’s Chief 
Minister describing the UK-Guernsey agreement as providing for “enhanced 
reporting of tax information along FATCA principles.” States of Guernsey, Press 
Release (May 14, 2013) available at http://www.gov.gg/article/107574/Chief-
Minister-emphasises-Guernseys-support-for-greater-global-tax-transparency. 
32 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Jersey to Improve 
International Tax Compliance, Annex I, art II (Reporting Financial Institutions 
may, as an alternative to the reporting procedures provided in the agreement, apply 
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the United Kingdom’s agreements with its crown dependencies lack 
the withholding tax enforcement mechanism of FATCA.   
In the same vein, the French “mini-FATCA” aims at overseas 
trusts and carries a penalty of the larger of €10,000 or 5% of the 
corpus for failure to provide detailed information on the assets of 
French residents.33 
FATCA as New Global Standard.  In addition to the jurisdictions 
emulating FATCA, many jurisdictions view FATCA as an 
opportunity to establish a global standard for automatic information 
exchange. For example, in discussing its new information-sharing 
agreements with its crown dependencies, the UK government stated 
that, “[t]he UK was quick to see the potential. . . to embed a new 
international standard in the exchange of information based around 
the FATCA model.  This would provide a step-change in the ability 
of the international community to tackle tax evasion, while 
minimizing costs for governments and business (who are already 
investing in the systems and processes necessary to comply with the 
US FATCA legislation and the subsequent intergovernmental 
agreements to implement it).” The United Kingdom announced that, 
in addition to its crown dependencies, it would seek to negotiate 
similar automatic information exchange agreements with other 
jurisdictions, and that these contemplated agreements, along with its 
own IGA with the United States “all form part of a drive to embed a 
new single international standard in the automatic exchange of tax 
information.”  Likewise, in May 2013, sixteen EU member states 
called for a “new global standard for automatic exchange of 
information to tackle tax evasion, based on the U.S. FATCA 
legislation.” Most importantly, in early 2014, the OECD 
announced,34 and the G20 approved,35  a new Common Reporting and 
 
the reporting procedures described in the “U.S. Treasury Regulations”).  See id., at 
art. 1.1(f), defining “U.S. Regulations” as those “Relating to Information Reporting 
by Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign 
Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities.” See also id. (incorporating 
amendments to the U.S. regulations, to the extent agreed by the parties). 
33 McCann & Nightingale, supra,  p 2 
34OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information: 
Common Reporting Standard (undated document declassified Jan 17, 2014)  at 6 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Automatic-
Exchange-Financial-Account-Information-Common-Reporting-Standard.pdf.   
  
8 UNITED STATES   [DRAFT: 8/15/14 
Due Diligence Standard for use by countries wishing to exchange 
information automatically.  The OECD describes this standard as 
“draw[ing] extensively on the intergovernmental approach to 
implementing FATCA” “with a view maximizing efficiency and 
reducing cost for financial institutions.”36    
Multilateral Information Exchange.  FATCA also seems to have 
precipitated or accelerated efforts at multilateral information 
exchange.  For example, the G5 announced that they will exchange 
information multilaterally based on the U.S. IGA Model 
Agreement.37  Likewise, official statements from the EU cast FATCA 
as providing “a unique opportunity to move from a series of bilateral 
agreements to a multilateral system.”38  Indeed, unilateral FATCA 
ultimately may help improve the leaky EU Savings Directive.39  
Veto-holding EU Member States attempting to preserve what was left 
of banking secrecy in their jurisdictions have blocked amendments to 
the Directive.40 Members of the EU Parliament, even when they 
vehemently oppose FATCA, seem to agree that FATCA has 
galvanized the EU into action.  For example, at a public 
 
35 See Commissioner Šemeta welcomes G20 Finance Ministers' agreement on 
global tax transparency standard, Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Daily, (Feb. 23, 
2014), Doc 2014-4106 , 2014 WTD 37-13. 
36 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange, supra note 34, at 3 (describing 
the aim of the standard as “to avoid a proliferation of different standards which 
would increase costs for both governments and financial institutions”). 
37 HM Treasury, Joint Communique on the ‘Model Intergovernmental 




38 Statement by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom on the Pilot Multilateral 
Automatic information Exchange  Facility, ECOFIN 14 May 2013 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-on-the-pilot-multilateral-
automatic-information-exchange-facility.  See also Council of the EU, Press 
Release, 3238th Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, 14 May 2013 at 
12, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/137122
.pdf. 
39 Council Directive 2003/48, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38 on taxation of savings. 
40 For the requirement of member state unanimity in tax matters, see Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, art. 115. 
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parliamentary hearing on FATCA, MEP Sophia in ‘t Veld 
(Netherlands) stated, “The fact that we’re welcoming the application 
of third country law on our territory is only a reflection of the 
weakness of the European Union.  We only have ourselves to blame 
because we were unable to adopt our own policies.”41   
If FATCA represents a new global standard for information 
exchange, that standardization would mitigate the concern by 
banking associations that they are being asked to shoulder an 
extraordinary administrative burden only with respect to Americans. 
If every country adopted a FATCA-like regime, FFIs would no 
longer be looking for American needles in a global haystack.  
Standardization according to the FATCA model also would mitigate 
FFIs’ concerns that they could be subject to a variety of conflicting 
reporting requirements imposed by different states.  Likewise, IGAs 
and attendant legislative changes in FATCA partner countries resolve 
conflicts between FFIs’ obligations under FATCA and their 
obligations under local law.  In short, multilateralism and cooperation 
may be the key to successful implementation of what has been 
criticized as unilateral and extraterritorial U.S. legislation. 
IV. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Even as IGAs solve conflicts between FATCA and foreign law, 
IGAs themselves raise domestic legal questions.  For example, 
Congressman Bill Posey (R.-Fla) recently sent a letter to U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Jack Lew questioning the legal authority under 
which the IGAs are negotiated and asking whether Treasury expects 
IGAs to be self-executing.42  
IGAs also raise political questions.  For example, to the extent 
that the United States negotiates reciprocal Model 1 IGAs,43  
implementing legislation presumably would be required to impose 
 
41 See EU parliamentary hearing on FATCA at 38:57 available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRoU-JNFhr0 .    
42 Letter from Congressman Bill Posey letter to Treasury Secr. Jack Lew (Jul. 
1, 2013). 
43 Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to 
Implement FATCA, art. 6, at 13-14 (describing U.S. commitments to exchange 
information on a reciprocal basis with the FATCA partner).  
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new reporting requirements on U.S. financial institutions,44 and such 
new reporting requirements likely would face political resistance 
from affected parties. If domestic financial institutions do not already 
possess account ownership information sufficient to determine their 
reporting obligations under reciprocal IGAs, their compliance 
burdens will increase (and, presumably, so will their political 
resistance to reciprocity).45  To take just one example, if domestic 
financial institutions ultimately will be obliged to apply FATCA’s 
pass-through rules for payments to entities, domestic financial 
institutions will face the problem of accounts held by Delaware LLCs 
for which they lack beneficial ownership information.46  
These are really just the tip of the iceberg; FATCA raises many 
additional questions. For example, can the U.S. standard become a 
worldwide standard, in light of competing pre-existing automatic 
information exchange obligations, such as the EU Savings 
Directive?47  Are the privacy protections afforded to account holders 
 
44 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: 
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 202 
(proposing to request such legislation) 
45 Under current IGAs, the reciprocal reporting obligations of the United States 
are limited to information that U.S. financial institutions already are required to 
collect concerning non-U.S. account holders.  See Model Intergovernmental 
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf, art 
2(2)(b), at 9. But the Model 1 IGA also includes a statement that the United States 
will pursue “equivalent levels of information exchange.”  See id., at 1. 
Additionally, under the heading “Reduce the Tax Gap and Make Reforms” the 
Analytical Perspectives for the 2014 budget briefly describes a budget proposal that 
would provide the Secretary of the Treasury authority to “prescribe regulations that 
would require reporting of information with respect to nonresident alien 
individuals, entities that are not U.S. persons, and certain U.S. entities held in 
substantial part by non-U.S. owners, including information regarding account 
balances and payments made with respect to accounts held by such persons and 
entities.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 202. The proposal notes that 
reciprocal exchange of information “similar” to that required from FFIs under 
FATCA would improve intergovernmental cooperation on FATCA enforcement. 
Id. 
46 See OECD Peer Review of the United States at 38, 87 (citing complaints by 
U.S. information exchange partner states that beneficial ownership information is 
not available for LLCs in several states, including Delaware). 
47 See, e.g., EU Commission, An Action Plan to Strengthen the Fight Against 
Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion, COM(2012) 772 final (Dec. 6, 2012) at 9  (“this 
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adequate under FATCA?  To what extent will developing countries 
benefit from a new standard of automatic information exchange, 
particularly when those countries lack the administrative apparatus to 
reciprocate information?48   
FATCA already represents a substantial commitment of 
government resources, both by FATCA partner jurisdictions and by 
the United States, which so far has developed and negotiated nineteen 
IGAs and written hundreds of pages of guidance.49 Affected financial 
institutions also have shouldered heavy burdens to implement a 
reporting regime that is estimated to raise only $8.7 billion over ten 
years.50 Moreover, the complexity and novel legal questions raised by 
FATCA, which have necessitated extended effective dates and the 
phasing-in of its provisions over a period of six years, raise questions 
about the ultimate fate of the legislation.  If political will for FATCA 
was founded principally on fiscal stress, will the United States 
abandon the regime as the economy improves?   
V. CONCLUSION 
Fiscal crisis emboldened the United States to use access to its 
capital markets as an enforcement mechanism for securing 
information about domestic taxpayers from foreign institutions. And, 
in turn, the U.S. passage of FATCA emboldened some our trading 
partners to rally behind a new standard of automatic information 
exchange. Thus, the initial outraged reactions to FATCA among 
private parties and government officials seems to be shifting to 
acquiescence by the FFIs, and at least some government officials 




document urges  the OECD to adopt reporting forms and software developed for 
implementing the EU Savings Directive”). 
48 For discussion, see Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging 
Countries: Will FATCA Open the Door?, 5 WORLD TAX J. 325-367 (2013).    
49 As of January 22, 2014.  For a current list of IGAs, see 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/pages/fatca-
archive.aspx 
50 See JCT, JCT Estimates Budget Effect of HIRE Act, JCX-5-10 (Feb. 23, 
2010).   
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES 
 
Sources of the exchange of information system in United States 
1. Which tax treaties between the United States and other 
countries, if any, contain the following?: 
a.   Art. 26 of the OECD MTC 
b.   Art. 26, paragraph 5, of the OECD MTC 
c.   Art. 27 of the OECD MTC    
 





No No No 
Australia (treaty 





Austria (treaty 1996) Yes, not 
exact 
language 























No No No 
Belgium (treaty 





Yes, not exact 
language 










51 Current (2006) U.S. Model Tax Treaty contains equivalent language in 
Article 26(5).  This chart indicates whether such language is included in the 
relevant treaties in force. 
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Yes Yes, not exact 
language  




Cyprus (treaty 1984) Yes, not 
exact 
language 
No (but see 
notes of 
exchange) 













Yes, not exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language  
Egypt (treaty 1980) Yes, not 
exact 
language 
No Yes, not exact 
language  
Estonia (treaty 1998) Yes, not 
exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language  





Yes, not exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language  











No No No 
Germany (treaty 




Yes, not exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language  
Greece (treaty 1950) Yes, not 
exact 
language 







no Yes, not exact 
language  
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Yes, not exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language  









No Yes, not exact 
language  










Italy (treaty 1999) Yes, not 
exact 
language 







No Yes, not exact 
language  












Yes, not exact 
language 
No 









No No No 
Latvia (treaty 1998) Yes, not 
exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language 







Yes, not exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language  
Luxembourg (treaty Yes, not Yes, not exact Yes, not exact 
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1996) exact 
language 
language language  
























Yes, not exact 
language 
Yes, not exact 
language  
New Zealand (treaty 
























No Yes, not exact 
language  

















No Yes, not exact 
language  























No Yes, not exact 
language  



















































(USSR treaty 1973) 
No No No 
Ukraine (treaty Yes, not No No 
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2. Is the United States a party to the OECD Mutual Assistance 
Convention of 1988 and the 2010 Protocol? 
The United States is party to the OECD Mutual Assistance 
Convention of 1988, which has been in force since April 1, 1995.52  
While the United States signed the 2010 Protocol (May 27, 2010), it 
has not been ratified nor entered into force. The United States entered 
reservations with respect to Articles 2, 3, 4, 17, 29 and 30.53   
 
3. Describe the Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) 
signed by United States with black or grey list countries. 
 
United States Tax Information Agreements 
Country Date In Force? 
American Samoa 1987 1988 
Antigua and Barbuda 2001 2003 
Aruba 2003 2004 
Bahamas 2002 2004/2006 
Barbados 1984 1984 
Bermuda 1988 1988 
Brazil 2007 2013 
 
52 See OECD, STATUS OF THE CONVENTION ON MUTUAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS AND AMENDING 
PROTOCOL, November 12, 2013, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-
of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf 
53 See id. 
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British Virgin Islands 2002 No 
Cayman Islands 2001 2004/2006 
Colombia 2001 No 
Costa Rica 1989 1991 
Dominica 1987 1988 
Dominica Republic 1989 1989 
Gibraltar 2009 2009/2010 
Grenada 1986 1987 
Guam 1989 No 
Guernsey 2002 2006 
Guyana 1992 1992 
Honduras 1990 1991 
Isle of Man 2002 2004/2006 
Jamaica 1986 1986 
Jersey 2002 No 
Liechtenstein 2008 2010 
Marshall Islands 1991 1991 
Mexico 1989 1990 
Netherlands Antilles 2002 2007 
Peru 1990 1991 
Puerto Rico 1989 1989 
St. Lucia 1987 1991 
Trinidad and Tobago 1989 1990 
The collection and exchange of information under anti-money-
laundering legislation 
The United States has implemented several different measures to 
prevent tax evasion and money laundering.  These are described 
briefly below. 
Investment Income Reporting.  Banks must report to the IRS 
information regarding the income that their customers earn in their 
individual banking and checking accounts.  Each January, banks 
provide to the IRS a report, IRS Form 1099-INT, which summarizes 
the interest income paid to their account holders.  The interest that 
must be reported includes interest paid by the bank on savings 
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accounts, interest-bearing checking accounts and bonds.    
Money Laundering.  When individuals deposit or withdraw more 
than USD 10,000 in a U.S. bank, the bank is required to file a 
“Currency Transaction Report” with the IRS.  Several exemptions 
prevent this reporting requirement from applying to certain retail and 
other customers.   This reporting requirement is designed to enable 
the IRS to detect money laundering and financial crimes.    
Tax Evasion Reporting.  A U.S. person who holds a financial 
interest in a non-U.S. bank account must file a Report of Foreign 
Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) if the aggregate value of the 
foreign financial accounts exceeds USD 10,000 at any time during 
the calendar year.  Penalties of up to USD 10,000 may apply for non-
wilfully failure to file an FBAR.  Wilful non-filing, can result in 
penalties as high as 50% of the value of the non-US account, and 
additional criminal penalties.  There is no cap on the amount of this 
penalty.  
Exchange of Information System in Practice: The Numbers 
The Internal Revenue Service has released the number of 
incoming exchange requests for the years 2006 to 2010.  The table 
below presents the number of incoming requests (i.e., from other 
countries to the United States) and outgoing requests (i.e., from the 
United States to other countries): 
 
INCOMING AND OUTGOING SPECIFIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
REQUESTS 
2006-201054 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 All 
Incoming  
(to US) 




221 197 236 203 165 1,022 
TOTAL 1,394 1,285 1,033 1,117 1,008 5,837 
 
 
54 Gen. Acc’t. Office, IRS’s Information Exchanges with Other Countries 
Could Be Improved through Better Performance Information, 21, Sept. 2011. 
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Taxing authorities, whether the IRS or a non-U.S. agency, 
respond to information requests with varying processing speeds, 
depending on the type of information requested.  The table below 
describes the processing time for different categories of information 
requests during the years 2006 to 2009. 
 
PROCESSING TIME FOR INFORMATION REQUESTS, BY INFORMATION 
CATEGORY, 2006-2009 55 
















Bank records 6 142 21 191 
Corporate records 31 142 24 156 
Public records 9 24 6 158 
Real estate records 1 104 2 207 
Records from security 
brokers 
1 128 0 103 
Tax return data 27 46 32 100 
Third-party interviews 20 141 6 147 
Other 5 34 9 129 
All cases where 
information type is 
known 
100 110 100 139 
Joint Audits and Multinational Audits 
1. Does the United States use joint audits? 
The United States engages in an audit cooperation program, the 
“Simultaneous Examination Program” and the “Criminal 
Investigation Program” (SCIP).  These programs are authorized by 
the exchange of information provisions of U.S. tax treaties and the 
tax information exchange agreements with other countries.  The 
United States uses these programs to investigate tax issues related to 
 
55 Id. 
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specific taxpayers in cases where a treaty party country has a 
common interest.  Under these programs taxing authority officials 
coordinate audit plans and information requests. 
 
2. How many agreements for joint audits have been concluded by 
the United States? How many joint audits have been 
conducted until now? 
The Internal Revenue Service, currently, the United States has 
working arrangements under its Simultaneous Examination Program 
(SEP) with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Norway, Philippines, Sweden and the United Kingdom.56  
According to the Internal Revenue Manual, the absence of a working 
agreement with a particular country does not prevent an examiner 
from recommending simultaneous examination because the legal 
basis for such examinations is the exchange of information article of 
tax treaties and TIEAs. 
The legitimacy of tax solutions other than exchange of information 
3. As far as the use of illegally obtained data (i.e. the LGT Bank 
case, the HSBC case and the UBS case) is concerned, it is not 
clear and homogeneous whether a public authority could 
profit of information acquired and/or received to support both 
an administrative and criminal tax assessment: what is the 
position of your country? 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides 
protection from “unreasonable searches and seizures” By the 
government. A person’s constitutional privacy rights can only be 
invaded where she has a “legitimate expectation of privacy.” The 
consequence of violating the privacy right is exclusion of evidence 
obtained as “fruit of a poisonous tree.” Some precedent unfavorable 
to the taxpayer exists on the question of whether a taxpayer has a 
legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to bank records.57  
 
56 IRS, Int. Rev. Man. 4.60.1.3, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-060-001.html#d0e440. 
57 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding that a U.S. 
taxpayer has no such legitimate expectation of privacy for Bahamian bank records 
stolen by U.S. law enforcement from the briefcase of a Bahamian bank official in 
the United States, at least in the case where Bahamian law provided little privacy 
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Even if such a reasonable expectation could be established, however, 
this right only offers protection from government action.  It therefore 
does not apply when non-governmental actors, including informants 
and whistleblowers, obtain the information.  As a result, provided the 
informant was not a government actor and was not acting at the 
behest of a government actor in gathering the information, the 
government would be able to use an informant’s information, even if 
the informant broke the law to obtain or convey the information.  
 
1. In case illegally obtained data are used to support an 
administrative and/or criminal tax assessment, is the taxpayer 
informed and/or allowed to be involved in the due course of 
procedure? Does the taxpayer have the possibility to reject 
the request and/or the use of data? Can the taxpayer refuse to 
collaborate with the Tax Administration without jeopardizing 
his position?  
 
The U.S. Constitution offers several protections for criminal 
defendants, including the right to confront witnesses and the right 
against self-incrimination.  Thus, a taxpayer would, in a criminal 
case, have the opportunity to challenge evidence obtained from a 
whistleblower (or any other evidence in the government’s case).   
With a court order, the United States can compel taxpayers to 
consent to foreign financial institutions’ disclosure of account 
information, including in cases where the government otherwise 
would be unable to obtain the records.  Compelled consent to 
disclosure pursuant to a court order has been held not to violate the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination because such consent is 
non-testimonial.58 Perhaps more importantly, compelled production 
of financial account records (e.g., through a subpoena), even where 
the records themselves or the act of producing them are self-
 
protection for those records). See also Timothy P. O’Toole, et al, Can a Prosecuter 
Make Your Cough Up Your Offshore Account? TAX NOTES p. 1313, 1314 (Mar. 
14, 2011) (expressing doubt whether the taxpayer-unfavorable expectation-of-
privacy analysis in Payner would apply in a case involving a foreign jurisdiction 
with strong bank-secrecy law). 
58 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).  See O’Toole, et al, supra 
note __, at 1315 (questioning the continued appliciability of Doe in light of 
subsequent precedent more favorable to criminal defendants) 
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incriminating, has been held to fall under the “required records” 
exception to the privilege against self-incrimination.  This exception 
applies in cases where the government seeks to compel production of 
documents kept pursuant to a valid regulatory regime.59 
2. In case your country has ever implemented a whistleblower 
program in order to collect tax information and to conduct 
tax assessments, is the reward to whistleblowers taxable? 
The Internal Revenue Service is authorized to pay whistleblower 
awards to individuals who report acts of tax noncompliance.  If the 
IRS uses the information provided to detect underpayment of taxes, it 
may pay the whistleblower up to 30% of the additional tax, penalty, 
and other amounts it collects.60  Whistleblower awards are fully 
taxable as gross income, and are subject to withholding.61  In 2012, 
the IRS Whistleblower Office issued administrative guidance 
describing a process by which award recipients may apply for a 
reduced withholding rate.62  Whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld was 
awarded USD 104 million for his assistance in building the case 
against UBS. 
3.  In case your country has ever implemented an offshore tax 
amnesty and/or an offshore voluntary disclosure program, 
 
59 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10, (No. 12-13131, D.C. 
Docket No. GJ 4-10) (D.C.Cir. 2013) available at 
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201213131.pdf at 4-5 (upholding 
district court’s ruling that the required records exception applied because “(1) 
federal law required [the taxpayers] to maintain and make available for inspection 
records regarding their foreign financial accounts; (2) that recordkeeping 
requirement… was ‘essentially regulatory’ and not criminal in nature; (3) the 
records were of the sort that ‘bank customers would customarily keep’; and (4) the 
records had ‘public aspects’ because they contained information that federal law 
[the taxpayers] to maintain and make available for inspection by the IRS [and]. . . 
report to the Treasury Department”.) Op. at 4-5.  The last requirements, (3) and (4) 
above, refer to (a) the requirement under the Bank Secrecy Act that U.S. persons 
keep certain records regarding foreign accounts, including the name and value of 
the account, and (b) the requirement to file an FBAR)  See also id. at 14 (citing 
other circuit courts reaching the same conclusions, including the Fifth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits). 
60 I.R.C. § 7623(b).   
61 I.R.C. § 61.   
62 See IRSIG WO -25-0612-03. 
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what is the ground of legitimacy for such initiatives? Do the 
programs cover administrative as well as criminal tax 
exposures? 
The IRS currently allows taxpayers to participate in an Offshore 
Voluntary Disclosure Program.  Under the current program, which 
has no deadline, individuals who disclose their offshore bank 
accounts are subject to a civil tax penalty of 27.5 percent of the 
highest aggregate balance in foreign bank accounts or value of 
foreign assets during the eight full tax years prior to the disclosure.63  
Individuals who participate in this program are not subject to criminal 
tax evasion charges, which could result in prison.64  The IRS offered 
similar voluntary disclosure initiatives in 200965 and 2011, albeit with 
disclosure deadlines and lower civil tax penalties.66  According to the 
IRS, these two initiatives resulted in 33,000 disclosures and more 
than USD 3.4 billion in collected taxes.67 A requirement common to 
all three programs was that, to be eligible to participate, the taxpayer 
had to disclose before the IRS received the taxpayer’s name from any 
other source (including John Doe summonses, UBS disclosures, etc). 
 
63 See IRS, IRS Offshore Programs Produce $4.4 Billion To Date for Nation’s 
Taxpayers; Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Reopens, Jan. 9, 2012. 
64 See id. 
65 See IRS, Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Voluntary-Disclosure:-Questions-and-Answers (first posted 
May 6, 2009). 
66 See IRS, 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked 
Questions and Answers, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/ 
International-Businesses/2011-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-
Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers (first posted Feb. 8, 2011). 
67 See id. 
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Some U.S. states offer similar voluntary disclosure programs, 
which is important because the federal and state governments share 
information, so any offshore information obtained by the United 
States can be made available to the U.S. person’s residence state.68 
4. Is your country discussing the implementation of a so called 
Rubik standard agreement with Switzerland or any other 
country? What would the ground of legitimacy be for such 
initiative? 
No, the Rubik agreements are not part of the U.S. strategy for 
combating tax evasion, as the United States prefers automatic 
exchange of information to anonymous withholding.  In February 
2013, the United States signed a Model 2 IGA with Switzerland 
under which covered Swiss financial institutions will automatically 
report U.S. persons’ account information directly to the IRS.  
Furthermore, the United States has developed a program under which 
Swiss banks that helped U.S. taxpayers evade their U.S. tax 
obligations can come forward, make aggregate disclosures (e.g., 
about where U.S. taxpayers leaving the participating bank transferred 
their funds), and thereby avoid prosecution.  The program does not 
apply to the 14 Swiss banks already subject to investigation by U.S. 
prosecutors. 
 
68 See, e.g., New Jersey Dept. of Treasury Press Release (Jun. 13, 2013) 
available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/offshore.shtml (describing state 
program that complements the federal OVDI under which participants “avoid all 
civil penalties, including the 50% civil fraud penalty. However, the 5% late 
payment penalty and the 5% amnesty penalty will not be waived”).   Similar 
programs are available in many states, including California, Connecticut, Florida, 
and New York. 
